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Abstract—Long lived attack campaigns known as
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have emerged as
a serious security risk. These attack campaigns are
customised for their target and performed step by
step during months on end. The major difficulty in
detecting an APT is keeping track of the different
steps logged over months of monitoring and linking
them. In this article, we describe TerminAPTor, an
APT detector which highlights links between the traces
left by attackers in the monitored system during the
different stages of an attack campaign. TerminAPTor
tackles this challenge by resorting to Information Flow
Tracking (IFT). Our main contribution is showing that
IFT can be used to highlight APTs. Additionally, we
describe a generic representation of APTs and validate
our IFT-based APT detector.
Index Terms—advanced persistent threat, chain of
attacks, information flow tracking, intrusion detection
I. Introduction
In recent years, Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)
have emerged as a new security risk for companies and
governments. An APT is an attack campaign customised
for its target and performed by highly skilled and highly
motivated people. The attackers have precise goals and will
do whatever it takes to achieve them, all the while avoiding
detection. APTs have been recognised as a threat [1]–[3],
but existing techniques are not able to detect them [4].
Research has started focusing on this problem [5], [6] but
no perfect solution has emerged yet.
Even though each APT is tailored for its target and,
thus potentially unique [7]–[10], their evolution usually
follows a pattern well summarised in [7]. An APT starts
with an initial reconnaissance step, followed by an initial
compromise; once a foothold is established, the attacker
will try to elevate their privileges and also move toward
their target, which entails more internal reconnaissance
and compromises; the final step, mission completion, is
usually data exfiltration. We believe that this represen-
tation is flexible enough to represent every known APT
and precise enough that it is the basis, in one form or
another, of most of the research work on detecting APTs
[11]–[14]. The hope is that by identifying the steps of an
APT and by linking them together, then the APT itself
can be detected. Most papers working on detecting APTs
use the preceding observation of how an APT unfolds to
base their approach on anomaly detection [15]–[18]. Since
APTs are potentially unique, it is impossible to predict
their exact behaviour and we feel that the phases described
earlier are merely a guideline and want to avoid any set of
hard rules based on their anticipated development.
This article focuses on the detection of long term attack
campaigns. APTs are represented here as a succession of
elementary attacks. These elementary attacks are detected
by a standard intrusion detection system (IDS). We claim
that detecting an APT is equivalent to highlighting the
links between elementary attacks. For highlighting these
links, we propose to track the information flows between
the elements of the system used by the elementary attacks.
To verify this claim, we have simulated two realistic APTs
scenarios. All these experiments are realised using our
product TerminAPTor.
The rest of the article is divided in five sections. In
Sec. II, we present existing research pertaining to the
detection of APTs and the use of information flow tracking
for security purposes. In Sec. III, we present our char-
acterisation of the monitored system and the attacker.
In Sec. IV, we present TerminAPTor, the APT detector
module, in details. In Sec. V, we present examples to show
how, using information flow tracking, TerminAPTor can
highlight APTs and to validate our approach. We also
check that it can operate in near real-time. Lastly, Sec. VI
concludes the paper.
II. Related works
In the following, we present how previous works have
modelled the different stages of APTs. We also present
the main characteristics of works about information flow
tracking for security purposes.
In [19], Giura and Wang first present the main stages
of an APT, which is basically the same model as in [12],
[13], [20] or the one we present in this paper. Based on
this model, they introduce the concept of attack pyramid,
an extension of attack trees. An attack tree represents a
threat, and is built recursively with the goal as the root
of the tree and ways to reach that goal as children, who
are then treated as new subgoals. A plane is the layer
upon which a threat occurs, such as lockpicking in the
physical plane or phishing on the user plane. The novelty
of attack pyramids over attack trees is that paths can cross
planes; this better reflects what happens during APTs
where attacks unfold over several planes. A set of rules
is then used to correlate events and detect security alerts.
When the risk and confidence factors of events and alerts
rise above a given threshold, an APT alarm is triggered.
This work is interesting because it specifically addresses
the detection of APTs and presents attack pyramids to
represent them, which takes into account the fact that an
APT can operate on several planes. However, it requires
that the potential goals of an APT, the paths leading
there and the sets of rules be defined beforehand and
updated frequently. This is specifically something that our
approach wants to avoid, because it involves a lot of work
to set up and maintain.
In [20], Sexton et al. decompose an APT into five
phases, delivery, exploit, install, command and control
(C&C), actions, which they call the attack chain. Contrary
to the attack pyramid which starts from the goal and
reconstructs possible attack paths, the attack chain is a
model for APTs. This is more flexible in that there is no
specified way to go from one phase to the next. Instead,
each phase is associated with a number of event types
indicative of this phase; events in different phases must
then be combined before an APT can be detected. To
combine them, each event is first assigned a score which
is used to compute a score for each event type and then
for each phase; an anomaly score is then computed for
each host and each cluster of host where the same type of
event is occurring. This work is interesting because it can
highlight clusters being the target of an APTs. However,
being based on anomaly detection, it requires that each
possible event be listed and attributed to a phase of the
APT model ahead of time.
Both of these approaches start from the same rough
model of an APT in phases along its chain of attack
and use it in different ways. This paper uses the same
rough model to highlight APTs, but in a third way.
However, both of these approaches require significant
expert knowledge to set up and maintain. Our approach
voluntarily distinguishes itself by eschewing the need for
expert knowledge about the system and attacks. Instead,
it requires tracking flows of information.
Information flow tracking refers to any method whose
aim is to follow the evolution of pieces of information inside
the observed system. For example, one application could
be to follow sensitive information in the system in order
to check that it isn’t leaked on the network. To do this, an
information flow tracking module has to be able to observe
every flow of information and moreover to check if the flow
involves a marked piece of information. This is usually
done by adding a taint to the pieces of information to
follow and then propagating that taint whenever a flow
of information contains already tainted information. The
main requirement of an information flow tracker is that
every flow of information is indeed tracked.
There are two main kinds of approaches for information
flow tracking. The first kind tracks the flows of information
inside a single program while the second kind tracks all the
flows inside a whole computer. Tracking the flows inside a
single program is done either through binary instrumen-
tation, like [21], or requires compilation of the source code
with a special compiler, like [22]. Tracking flows inside a
whole computer is usually done at the hardware level, thus
requiring custom hardware, like [23], [24]. Deploying either
approach is not very practical, requiring either custom
hardware or modifying all the binaries on a system. An
approach with the benefits of system-wide monitoring but
without the cost associated with custom hardware is [25],
where the authors modify qemu, a CPU emulator; this is
an interesting compromise but cannot run on bare metal.
There is another option for system wide tracking with-
out custom hardware or the need to modify every binary
on the system: modify the OS to do the tracking. This is
the approach adopted by [26], [27]. This way, the modifi-
cation is software only and only needs to be done once. For
example, in [27], the authors modify the Android OS in
order to check that applications do not leak private data,
and call it TaintDroid. They leverage the fact Android
applications run on the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) and
modify it to track information flows, even when the JVM
interacts with the OS and during interprocess communica-
tions. Additionally, TaintDroid can track multiple sources
of taints to better pinpoint the source of the data.
In this paper, we use a mix of kernel space and user
space probes to track information flows. The flows are
collected and then centralised. Only then are taints as-
sociated and propagated.
III. Characterisation
In this part we characterise both the monitored system
and the attacker. We also list the requirements for the
information flow tracking and enumerate the phases of an
APT used in our model.
We propose here to protect enterprise networks from
APTs. These networks are a mix of computer systems
used as servers and others used as workstations. Each
one of these computer systems is monitored by an agent.
This agent has two roles; first it detects security violations
and raises alerts, which can be done by classical intrusion
detection systems; and second, it records information flows
in the system and associates them with security alerts
when appropriate. TerminAPTor then uses the output of
the agent to check if separate security alerts are related
and part of the same attack campaign. In the rest of the
paper, we assume that the agent does detect all security
alerts and only security alerts.
The attacker has a very precise goal and follows the
steps of an APT: reconnaissance, compromise, establish
presence, any number of lateral movements composed of
the previous three steps but on the internal network and
then mission completion. Except for the reconnaissance
part, we suppose here that the attacker has to exploit
an existing tool or deploy their own in order to progress
from one step to the next. For example, in the compromise
part, the attacker will send a spearphishing email with a
document containing a payload. When the document is
opened, the payload installs a Remote Access Tool (RAT)
which is then used in the establish presence phase. In
any case, if TerminAPTor can show the links between the
different steps all the way to the mission completion step
at the end, then it will have highlighted the chain of attack
used in this APT.
Thus, we assume that the attacker is capable of infil-
trating any system they want to. To do so, they exploit
existing tools or insert their own. Through the exploitation
of these tools, the attacker goes from one step to the next;
and these exploitations create flows of information that we
track. One caveat is that the attacker does not want to be
detected, so, for example, even though the attacker could
become administrator and disable the monitoring agent,
doing so would alert to their presence, thus, the attacker
will not disable the monitoring agent or take any other
actions leading to their being discovered.
In an attack campaign, each attack is part of a series
of coordinated attacks. Thus, we define a chain of attacks
as the list of attacks in an attack campaign, and we do
not make a difference between an attack campaign and
an APT. Each step in an attack campaign is an attack,
and for a given attack, the attacks in the attack campaign
which were used to set it up are called the direct ancestors
and they are placed before the attack in the chain. More
generally, ancestors of an attack are the attacks which
precede it in the chain. Similarly, the direct descendants
of an attack are the attacks which it sets up, and they are
placed after it in the chain. We also generalise the concept
of descendant to all the attacks after it in the chain.
IV. TerminAPTor, the APT detector
TerminAPTor acts over a supervision system composed
of classical IDS which also record information flows. The
IDS outputs data which are composed of events in chrono-
logical order, order which is assumed correct. The IDS
also raises alerts whenever an attack is found. Each alert
includes the list of events which triggered it. Thus, an
attack is a list of events. Some event types can also be
interpreted as flows of information. Every event inter-
preted as a flow of information is listed in Tab. I; each
line in the table indicates that information is passed from
the input objects to the output objects. For example, for
the “Read file” event type, there is a flow of information
from the file to the process reading it. As such, events are
considered a tuple with four values: the event type, the
timestamp, a list of references of input objects, and a list
of references of output objects. If the lists of objects are
empty, then the event cannot be interpreted as a flow of
information. Objects are elements of the monitored system
which either contain data (files and processes) or are
communication channels (sockets). These flows are then
processed in chronological order to perform information
flow tracking.
Taking the list of events, whether they are part of an
attack, and their associated information flows as our only
known data, we aim to highlight chains of attacks. Our
work is built on the intuition that if two attacks are
TABLE I
List of events and their information flows
Type of event Input objects Output objects
Create process current process new process
Execute file filename current process
Change permissions current process filename
Change owner current process filename
Create file current process filename
Read file filename current process
Write file current process filename
Receive packet remote socket local socket
current process
Send packet local socket remote socket
current process
consecutive steps in a chain of attacks, then there must be
an information flow from the outputs of the events part
of the first one to the inputs of events part of the second
one. Since the first attack sets up the next, there should
be an information flow from the first attack to the tools
it uses and from these tools to the second attack. Let’s
take as example two attacks: the first attack installs a
RAT, and the second uses that RAT to exfiltrate sensitive
data. In this example, there is an information flow from
the first attack to the RAT and then from the RAT to the
second attack. Thus, if we want to link attacks in attack
chains, we need to be able to differentiate the information
flows depending on which attack they went through; the
solution is to create a new tag to represent each newly
detected attack. Tags are immutable and represent one
and only one attack. They are attached to object through
propagation. Whenever an object becomes tagged with a
given tag, then it means that this object is part of an
information flow coming from the attack represented by
this tag.
The tags representing each attack are propagated
through the monitored system by flows of information, and
the attack chains are highlighted at the same time. Each
flow of information is processed in chronological order.
The propagation is done differently whether the inputs
are tagged and whether the event is part of an attack:
1) The inputs are not tagged and the event is not part
of an attack: the event is ignored;
2) The inputs are tagged and the event is not part of
an attack: the tags on the inputs are propagated to
the outputs (Propagate);
3) The inputs are not tagged and the event is part of
an attack: a new chain of attacks containing only
this attack is added to the list of chains of attacks
(CreateChain) and the tag representing the attack
is propagated to the outputs (Propagate);
4) The inputs are tagged and the event is part of an
attack: the attack is appended to the appropriate
chains of attacks (AppendAndMergeChains) and
the tag representing the attack is propagated to the
outputs (Propagate).
The Propagate function merges the tags already present
on the output with all the tags present on the inputs as
in (1); let I be the set of inputs and O the set of outputs
for a given event:
∀O ∈ O, Tags(Otn )  Tags(Otn−1) ∪
∪
I∈I
Tags(Itn−1) (1)
When a new attack is detected, its links to other attacks
can show that previously unrelated attacks are in fact
related. The AppendAndMergeChains function must
take this into account. Let LCA be the list of chains of
attacks (2). First, all the tags of the inputs of the new
attack are put in a set, T (3). Then, each chain in LCA
finishing with a tag in T is moved to Lnew , a new list (4).
Then, each chain in LCA containing at least one tag of T
is copied; each copy is truncated after the last tag of T in
it; the truncated copies are put in Lnew (5). Then, all the
chains in Lnew are merged by creating a new chain with
all the attacks in chronological order (6); the new attack
is appended to this chain (7); This new chain is added to
LCA (8).
LCA  {A1 − A4 ,A2 − A5 ,A3} (2)
new attack: A6, T  {2, 4} (3)
LCA  {A2 − A5 ,A3}
Lnew  {A1 − A4}
(4)
LCA  {A2 − A5 ,A3}
Lnew  {A1 − A4 ,A2}
(5)
LCA  {A2 − A5 ,A3}
Lnew  {A1 − A2 − A4}
(6)
LCA  {A2 − A5 ,A3}
Lnew  {A1 − A2 − A4 − A6}
(7)
LCA  {A1 − A2 − A4 − A6 ,A2 − A5 ,A3} (8)
V. Examples of APT detections
The aim of these examples is to show that TerminAPTor
is capable of highlighting whole attack campaigns. All the
tests used here are reproducible and available in [28].
As a first example, we detail an APT targeted at
a web server with a database. The attack campaign is
composed of four attacks. Simultaneously, two other in-
dependent attacks also take place. For the duration of the
scenario, standard web server usage is also simulated. In
the attack campaign, the attacker starts by exploiting the
shellshock vulnerability to install a Remote Access Tool
(RAT) (Attack1 ). Using the RAT, the attacker exploits
a vulnerable application and starts a reverse shell with
administration level rights (Attack2 ). The attacker uses
this shell to install a scheduled task which starts a second
RAT also with administrator level rights (Attack3 ). This
second RAT is used to exfiltrate the website’s database
(Attack4 ). While this is going on, two other attackers are
active. The first one acts between Attack1 and Attack2 , us-
ing an SQL injection to exfiltrate the database (Attack5 ).
The last attacker acts between Attack3 and Attack4 , and
uses the shellshock vulnerability to exfiltrate the list of
users and passwords on the server (Attack6 ).
Attack1
Attack5
Attack2 Attack3
Attack6
Attack4 Chain 1
Chain 2
Fig. 1. Results of the information flow tracking on the server
Attack1 Attack2 Attack3 Attack4 Chain 1
Fig. 2. Results of the information flow tracking on the workstation
The logs produced by the IDS are collected at the
end of the scenario. First, all the attacks are detected
and the events that triggered their detection identified.
Then, TerminAPTor is launched to highlight links between
attacks and extract the chains. The results are shown
in Fig. 1. The first chain of attack accurately links the
attack campaign we wanted to detect. This shows that
TerminAPTor is capable of properly linking attacks part of
the same attack campaign. This is very encouraging since
some steps are executed only indirectly by the previous
attack, e.g. Attack2 starts Attack3 through a scheduled
task, but they are still properly linked. The second high-
lighted chain of attack is a false positive. TerminAPTor
detects an attack campaign because all three attacks use
the same entry point even though they are unrelated. This
is because our flow tracking cannot follow information
flows inside processes. Thus, the module has to taint every
output of a process with the taints of all the inputs, which
causes false positives.
The second example showcases an attack campaign tar-
geted at a workstation. The attack campaign is composed
of four attacks. The monitored system is a single machine
used as a workstation. The attack campaign starts when
the attacker sends a phishing email to the user of the
workstation. The email contains an infected pdf file which
is not detected by the various antivirus software protecting
the workstation. When the user opens the file, a simple
RAT is launched (Attack1 ). The attacker uses this RAT
to install a larger, more feature complete RAT (Attack2 ).
The attacker uses the second RAT to inspect the system
and find a mean to elevate their privilege (Attack3 ).
With elevated privileges, the attacker installs a third RAT
and enables persistence (Attack4 ), so that the third RAT
restarts with the workstation.
Like in the first scenario, the logs are collected at the end
of the scenario This time TerminAPTor finds one chain of
attack as shown in Fig. 2. This scenario is simpler since
each step directly launches the next and, as expected,
TerminAPTor properly follows the flows of information
and links the four attacks in a single attack campaign.
While the results are encouraging, we believe that they
could be improved upon by a second phase to filter out
false positives. In this regard, we are currently working on
using our representation of APTs to create Markov models,
based in part on the ideas in [29], [30]. Such models would
be used to assess the quality of each link.
Additionally, our validation would benefit a lot from
a public corpus of APT scenarios. Not only would this
make validation more robust, but it enables comparing the
results of different solutions. For example, it would have
been very interesting to compare our results to those of
the solutions presented in Sec.II.
Lastly, since the processing can be done on a separate
machine, it has no impact on the monitored system. The
only requirement is that it should be done in near real
time. In order to test TerminAPTor on month long logs,
we took the data from the APT against a server scenario
and augmented it by mixing and mutating the original
log as well as by inserting attacks. This produced a 67 day
long log. In all, 3.2 billion events are processed, containing
500 attacks, over 67 days. This represents an average of 48
million events and 7.4 attacks per day. Processing the log
on a single core took a bit less than 3 days and never
exceeded 35MB in RAM usage. The aim of processing
events in near real time is certainly met, especially since
the code could certainly be optimised.
VI. Conclusion
This article proposes a new approach for detecting long
lived attack campaign. The intuition leading to this work
is that when an attacker constructs an APT step by step,
each of these steps is a single attack. We claim that every
single attack can be detected by a traditional intrusion
detection system. Our main challenge was thus to be able
to establish a link between these different attacks. In this
article, we propose to retrace these links by observing in-
formation flows between traces left by the attacker during
every single attack. We describe TerminAPTor, the tool
being born from this idea. We present also some experi-
ments as close as possible to real life APTs, using actual
APT samples. These tests showed that our intuition is
correct insofar that TerminAPTor accurately highlighted
the chain of attacks targeting the monitored system.
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